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Abstract 
This study is a first attempt to unravel the almost unexplored 
domain of abstract conceptual knowledge. Four kinds of 
abstract concepts (nominal kinds, states of the self, cognitive 
processes, and emotion concepts) were investigated in two 
experiments. Emotion concepts displayed a specific pattern in 
both concreteness/abstractness and imagery ratings (cf. 
Altarriba et al., 1999), as did the other considered domains of 
abstract knowledge (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2 we 
highlighted the specific pattern of information (taxonomic, 
thematic, attributive, etc) these different abstract domains 
elicited in a definition production task.  
 
Keywords: Conceptual knowledge; abstract concepts; 
abstract conceptual domains. 
Introduction 
Concrete concept nouns, such as chair and book, differ from 
abstract concept nouns, such as freedom and language. 
While the former refer to entities that are perceivable and 
spatially constrained, the latter refer to entities characterized 
by properties that are neither perceivable nor spatially 
constrained. Paivio’s (1971; 1986; Paivio, Yuille, & 
Madigan, 1986) Dual Code Theory was a first attempt to 
explain this difference. In this perspective, while abstract 
nouns are coded only by the verbal system, concrete nouns 
are coded by both the verbal and the imagens systems, and 
this explains why concrete nouns, which are more 
imageable, are also remembered better than abstract ones. In 
fact, while the former may benefit from two memory codes, 
the latter benefits from only one (cf. Paivio, 1983 for a 
review of dual code empirical evidence). 
Although the different degree of imageability can explain 
a good deal of the processing differences between abstract 
and concrete nouns, it is not enough to fully clarify them. 
Studying word context availability, Schwanenflugel and 
Shoben (1983) showed that it is more difficult to find an 
appropriate context for abstract than for concrete words. 
Accordingly, when abstract and concrete words were 
preceded by an appropriate context, no difference between 
them was found in reading time. Moreover, context 
availability ratings were shown to correlate with both 
concreteness (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983; Altarriba, 
Bauer & Benvenuto, 1999) and imageability ratings 
(Wiemer-Hastings, Krug & Xu, 2001) and to be a good 
predictor of lexical decision performance (Schwanenflugel, 
Harnishfeger, & Stowe, 1988).  
As Altarriba, et al. (1999) remarked, the correlation 
between concreteness ratings and the other dimensions of 
concept nouns, such as imageability and context 
availability, has often been calculated contrasting the ratings 
obtained on the whole set of abstract and concrete nouns. 
This might have obscured possible effects due to their sub-
domains. This is suggested by the fact that, in their research, 
while imageability did correlate with concreteness in the 
overall analysis, it did not when the sets of concrete, 
abstract and emotion words were analyzed independently. 
The analysis of emotion words showed that they were 
considered significantly less concrete than abstract words. 
Moreover, their context availability was lower than that of 
abstract words, and they were rated as more imageable than 
abstract words, but less imageable than concrete ones. The 
authors interpreted these results as evidence that concrete, 
abstract and emotion words belong to different domains 
with emotion concept nouns differing from other abstract 
concept nouns, contrary to what is usually assumed. In a 
subsequent study, after replicating these results, Altarriba & 
Bauer (2004) also found that concrete, abstract and emotion 
words differed in a free recall task and in a lexical decision 
task with a priming paradigm. Similarly, both Nelson & 
Schreiber (1992) and Wiemer-Hastings, Krug & Xu (2001), 
with a concreteness rating task, found that while 
concreteness ratings were distributed into two general 
clusters, referring to concrete and abstract items, different 
degrees of concreteness were present within each cluster. 
Thus, the same difference between concrete and abstract 
concept nouns, which seems intuitively obvious, apparently 
is not so clear-cut, as the different concreteness ratings, 
observed between abstract and concrete concept nouns 
(Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001), and the results obtained 
with emotion concepts (Altarriba et al., 1999) have shown. 
Furthermore, while words referring to concrete objects 
usually studied are nouns, abstract terms are nouns, verbs, 
adjectives and adverbs. While concrete concept nouns 
usually refer to two distinct kinds of entities, i.e. natural 
kinds and artefacts, the variety of abstract concept nouns is 
large and unknown. While the domains of both natural 
kinds, e.g. plants and animals, and artefacts, e.g. tools and 
vehicles, are well differentiated (see Keil, 1989), the domain 
of abstract concept nouns, instead, has been scarcely 
explored thus far, emotion words aside. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to suppose that the overall domain of abstract 
concepts can also be distinguished in sub-domains. In fact, 
on intuitive grounds, some abstract concepts seem to be 
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“less abstract” than others like, for example, entrance and 
idea.  
The aim of this study was to provide evidence that the 
overall domain of abstract concepts can be divided into 
different sub-domains. It is worth noting that we do not aim 
to produce an exhaustive taxonomy of abstract concepts. In 
fact, our starting point was the set of abstract concepts 
already studied as an homogeneous domain in previous 
works, with the aim to show that some well differentiated 
types can be distinguished into it. 
Therefore, in Experiment 1 participants were asked to rate 
a set of abstract concept nouns, which were supposed to 
belong to four different domains (cognitive processes, 
emotions, nominal kind and states of the self), on four 
dimensions (concreteness, context availability, imageability 
and abstractness) in order to check whether the considered 
abstract conceptual domains are differentiated along these 
dimensions. Moreover, as many studies on concrete 
concepts have shown that different types of information 
characterise their kinds, it is possible to suppose that also 
the domains of abstract concepts are characterised by 
information of different types. Hampton (1981), for 
example, suggested that the features elicited by abstract 
concept nouns describe situations (i.e. agents, actions and 
goals). Recently, Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings (in press) 
found that all the concepts elicited situational information 
by comparing abstract (truth), intermediate (a cook), and 
concrete concepts (a bird) in an oral characteristic-
production task. Concrete and abstract concepts, however, 
differed in the type of situations elicited. While the 
situational content of concrete concepts consisted primarily 
of situations referring to agents, the content of abstract 
concepts consisted in events and introspective statements. 
Analysing the linguistic contexts provided by the verbs with 
which abstract words co-occur, Wiemer-Hastings & 
Graesser (2000) showed that abstract concepts may be better 
conceived of as being defined by the ‘abstract structure’ of 
the situations in which they are used. This abstract structure 
is derived from the multiple situations, which abstract items 
can fit into, and it is similar to a script because it specifies 
the relations linking the entities involved in a particular 
situation (causal, temporal, and spatial relations). Wiemer-
Hastings, Barnard & Faelner (2003) identified the main 
organizing principle of abstract knowledge in thematic 
relations. They found that concrete and abstract concepts 
differed in their exemplars’ degree of distinctiveness. That 
is, the exemplars of abstract categories were judged as more 
similar to the exemplars of other categories than the 
concrete categories ones. They also found that, while 
concrete concept similarity evaluations were based on 
taxonomic relations, those provided for abstract concepts 
were based on thematic relations. Moreover, the crucial role 
of thematic knowledge in abstract concepts was also found 
in children (Caramelli, Setti, & Maurizzi, 2004) as well as 
in five groups of people differing in the type of expertise 
(Setti, Borghi, Caramelli, submitted).  
In this theoretical framework, Experiment 2 was carried 
out in order to verify whether concrete and abstract concepts 
are characterized by different patterns of conceptual 
information as well as whether the different domains of 
abstract concepts already studied in Experiment 1 differ in 
the types of conceptual information they elicit. 
Experiment 1 
This study consisted in two parts. The first was aimed at 
selecting the concept nouns belonging to distinct domains of 
abstract knowledge and the second at verifying with rating 
tasks whether these domains differed along the dimensions 
usually assumed to discriminate abstract and concrete 
concepts (concreteness, context availability and 
imageability). Also the dimension “abstractness” was added, 
as it was supposed to provide further information than that 
provided by the concreteness dimension, and, thus, to better 
discriminate the domains of abstract concepts. In fact, it 
cannot be given for granted in advance that the abstractness 
and concreteness dimensions are symmetrical.  
We hypothesised that if the selected abstract concepts 
belonged to different conceptual domains their ratings 
should differ along the considered dimensions (cf Altarriba 
et al., 1999).   
Part 1. Abstract concepts selection and familiarity 
assessment. 
A wide set of abstract concept nouns was created, taken 
from both Altarriba et al. (1999) and Oatley and Johnson-
Laird (1987). Following their intuition, the two 
experimenters divided all the collected abstract concept 
nouns into ten different appropriately labelled categories. 
Among these, only the four categories that included the 
largest amount of items were retained for further study. In 
order to corroborate the experimenters’ intuition, 3 
independent judges, who were blind to the hypotheses, were 
asked to part the stimuli into the four categories: cognitive 
processes, states of the self, nominal kinds and emotions. 
The judges substantially agreed with the experimenters’ 
partitions and the few cases of disagreement were solved 
following brief discussion. The set of abstract concept 
nouns thus obtained consisted of 135 items.  The familiarity 
assessment was carried out on this set of 135 concept nouns, 
out of which 25 belonged to the domain of cognitive 
processes (e.g. thought), 25 to that of states of the self (e.g. 
childhood), 25 to that of nominal kinds (e.g. error), and 60 
to that of emotions (e.g. fear). The 135 selected concept 
nouns were divided into 2 lists with the number of each type 
of concept balanced among the lists. In each list the concept 
nouns were arranged in 2 random orders. Ten participants 
for each one of the four lists rated “how much the meaning 
of these words is familiar/known” on a 7-point scale. In 
total the data of 20 super-subjects were collected. The most 
familiar concept nouns belonged to the domain of cognitive 
processes [M = 6; SD = 0.6], followed by that of states of 
the self [M = 5.95; SD = 0.5], that of nominal kinds [M = 
5.79; SD = 0.9] and that of emotions [M = 5.72; SD = 0.8]. 
Part 2. Assessment of concreteness, context 
availability, imageability, and abstractness 
Method 
Participants One hundred and sixty university students 
took part in this experiment as volunteers. All of them were 
Italian native speakers.  
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Materials and Procedure From each of the four abstract 
domains (cognitive processes, states of the self, nominal 
kinds and emotions) 18 concept nouns, the familiarity of 
which was balanced, were selected as the experimental set. 
To these 72 concept nouns, 60 concrete concept nouns (30 
natural kind and 30 artefacts) were added as fillers. The total 
set of 132 concept nouns thus obtained was divided into two 
lists, in each of which the types of concept nouns were 
balanced. In each list the concept nouns were differently 
randomized. This procedure was repeated for each one of 
the four ratings. Eight different groups of participants were 
asked to rate the imageability, or the context availability, or 
the concreteness, or the abstractness degree of the items on a 
7-point scale (e.g. “Please evaluate how concrete is x on the 
scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very much. Please use 
also the intermediate steps of the scale”). Thus, each 
participant evaluated half of the experimental materials on 
only one dimension.  
Results 
An Analysis of Variance was performed on the ratings with 
Rating scale (concreteness, abstractness, context 
availability, and imageability) as the within items variable 
and Abstract conceptual domains as the between items 
variable. The factor Rating scale was significant: F (3,204) 
= 113.3; MSe =  .41; p < .001, while the factor Abstract 
concept domain showed only a trend toward significance: F 
(3,68) = 2.3; MSe = .56; p < .08. The interaction was 
significant: F (9,204) = 12.8; MSe = .41; p < .001. As for 
the main effect of the Rating scale, context availability and 
abstractness obtained the highest ratings (respectively M = 
4.4 and M = 4.7), followed by imagery ratings (M = 3.7) 
with concreteness obtaining the lowest ratings (M = 2.9). 
All the differences were significant at the post hoc 
Newman-Keuls analysis (p < .01).  
 
Table 1:  Mean rating for each kind of concepts on each 
scale (Standard Deviation in brackets). 
 
Kind of concept Concr Abstr C A Imag 
Cognitive proc 2.5(.4) 5(.7) 4.7(.4) 3.2(.5) 
Nominal kinds 3.3(.6) 3.8(.8) 4.4(.9) 3.6(1.1) 
States self 3.5(.8) 3.9(.6) 4.8(.9) 4(.6) 
Emotions 2.3(.2) 4.9(.4) 4.9(.4) 3.8(.5) 
 
As Table 1 shows, concreteness and abstractness ratings 
displayed an opposite trend in the interaction, as expected. 
Cognitive processes and emotion concept nouns were 
judged as less concrete, and more abstract, than states of the 
self and nominal kind concept nouns (Newman-Keuls,  p < 
.01). The abstract conceptual domains did not significantly 
differ in their context availability, although, on average, 
nominal kinds led to lower ratings (M = 4.4) than emotion 
concepts (M = 4.9). Cognitive processes, that were judged 
as the most abstract (and less concrete), were also less 
imageable (M = 3.2) than states of the self concept nouns 
(M = 4.07) (Newman-Keuls,  p < .01). Thus, at least to 
some extent and apart from context availability, each of the 
abstract conceptual domains investigated was differently 
characterized by the dimensions considered.  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 verified the hypothesis that the 
overall abstract concepts domain can be split into more 
specific domains. Not only concreteness and abstractness 
ratings showed an opposite trend, i.e. these dimensions are 
symmetrical, but also the 4 selected abstract conceptual 
domains were differentiated on the dimensions considered. 
In particular, cognitive processes and emotion concept 
nouns differed from both states of the self and nominal kind 
concepts with the former rated as more abstract and less 
concrete than the latter. Moreover, cognitive processes 
concept nouns were rated as less imageable than states of 
the self concept nouns, which were the most imageable and 
obtained a relatively high concreteness rating. Since the 
relevance of relations in conceptual knowledge has been 
widely recognized as a means for distinguishing between 
the kinds of concrete concepts (Barsalou, 1993; Lin & 
Murphy, 2001; Markman, 1989; Borghi, Caramelli & Setti, 
2005), Experiment 2 was carried out in order to identify 
which relations are elicited by the 4 abstract conceptual 
domains differentiated in the rating tasks. In fact, it is 
possible to suppose that, if cognitive processes, emotions, 
states of the self, and nominal kind concept nouns differ, 
they should convey different patterns of conceptual 
information as expressed by the relations upon which their 
definitions rest. 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment a definition production task was used in 
order to verify the following hypotheses: a.1. Abstract 
concepts should differ from concrete ones as far as the 
information their definitions rests on is concerned. a.2. As 
the concrete concept domain is articulated in different sub-
domains characterized by eliciting specific types of 
information, so should the abstract concept domain; b. In 
the four sub-domains of the abstract concepts considered, 
emotion concepts should elicit a different pattern of 
relations from those elicited by the other abstract domains 
as they were already shown to differ in both rating and 
lexical decision tasks (Altarriba & Bauer, 2004). 
Method 
Participants Eighteen university students who did not take 
part in the preceding experiment volunteered for this 
experiment.  
Materials and Procedure From the materials used in 
Experiment 1, 10 concepts for each group were selected so 
that familiarity was balanced (cognitive processes M = 6.3; 
nominal kinds M = 6.1; states of the self M = 6.1; emotions 
M = 6.3). Twenty concrete concepts (10 natural kinds and 
10 artefacts) were added to these 40 concepts, bringing the 
total set of materials to 60 concept nouns, arranged into two 
differently randomised lists. Under each concept noun a few 
blank lines were left free for responses. Participants were 
asked to provide a definition for each concept noun.  
Data coding The definitions produced were transcribed and 
parsed into their constituent components (joy – mental 
condition/ favourable and pleasant). The components of the 
definitions thus obtained were coded according to the type 
of relation linking the components to the given concept 
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noun (in the preceding example ‘mental condition’ – 
taxonomic superordinate; ‘favourable and pleasant’ – 
attributive). The coded relations were the following: 
1. Taxonomic relations: establishing the hierarchical 
structure of conceptual knowledge. They included: the 
Superordinate level (fear - feeling); the subordinate level 
(mind - consciousness); and coordinate level (worry – state 
of anxiety).  
2. Thematic relations: linking objects that co-occur in the 
same situation or event. They included: spatial relation 
(mind – in the brain); temporal relation (impression – in one 
moment); means relation (comprehension – the way we 
understand); cause relation (disappointment – due to 
someone or something); effect relation (hunger – look for 
food), function relation (memory – for maintaining mental 
information); action relation (attention – to concentrate); 
event relation, i.e. the description of a situation resulting 
from different actions, (for example: profit – to receive 
something as compensation for an accomplishment). 
3. Attributive relations: referring to the physical 
characteristics or qualities of objects. They included 
perceptual property relations referring to texture, shape, 
colour, and evaluations (profit - advantageous).  
4. Stereotypes: used for conventional associations (mind-
genius) and idiosyncratic associations (creativity – to go 
further). 
5. Examples: used for objects/people considered by the 
participant as an instantiation of the given concept (bother – 
itchiness) (see Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, in press).  
6. Other: This code was used for general comments and 
simple repetitions of the concepts. 
Data Analysis and Results 
One participant’s data were excluded from analysis 
because of failure in responding to most of the stimuli. 
Overall, taxonomic relations were the most frequently 
produced in participants’ definitions. This result was 
expected as in their educational curriculum students are 
trained to provide formal definitions such as “A is a kind of 
B”. However, thematic relations were the second most 
produced in all the conceptual domains considered. 
Thematic relations were produced more often in abstract 
concepts definitions (M = 29%) than in concrete concepts 
ones (M = 26%). This result replicated in adults that 
obtained with an associations production task in children 
(Caramelli, Setti & Maurizzi, 2004). 
In order to establish which relations characterized the 
definitions of the different kinds of concepts, the 
Correspondence Analysis was used. In Correspondence 
Analysis the frequencies of the relations produced give rise 
to a broad data matrix allowing the identification of their 
weight and their graphical representation as points in a 
multidimensional space. On the graph, the geometrical 
proximity of the points shows the degree of their association 
and the similarity of their distribution (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham & Black, 1992; Greenacre & Blasius, 1994). The 
aim of the Correspondence Analysis is to represent the rows 
and the columns of a two-way contingency table (profiles) 
as points in corresponding low-dimensional vector spaces. 
In order to project the observed points onto a low-
dimensional subspace, it is necessary to define the Chi 
square metric as the distance in the space of the profiles. In 
fact, the distances between the points are the weighted 
distances (Chi square) between the relative frequencies and 
not the simple Euclidean distances (Hair et al., 1992). Thus, 
the logic underlying the Correspondence Analysis is quite 
similar to that of Factor Analysis. Similarly to Factor 
Analysis, the first dimension explains a Total Inertia higher 
than that explained by the further dimensions. The 
maximum number of dimensions is the minimum between 
the number of columns minus 1 and the number of rows 
minus 1.  
Two analyses were performed, one on all the types of 
concepts studied and the other on the different domains of 
abstract conceptual knowledge only. 
 (A) Analysis on all the concept types. A Correspondence 
Analysis was performed, the variables of which were all the 
kinds of concepts (cognitive processes, states of the self, 
nominal kinds and emotion concepts natural kinds and 
artefacts) and the sub-sets of the different kinds of the 
relations produced (superordinate, subordinate and 
coordinate levels of Taxonomic relations; spatial, temporal, 
means, cause, effect, function, action, and event relations of 
Thematic relations; Perceptual and Evaluative relations of 
the Attributive relation; Stereotypes, and Examples). The 
productions coded Other amounted only to 2.8%, thus they 
were not further analysed. 
As shown in Figure1, on the first dimension, explaining 
53% of the total variance, natural kind and artefact 
concepts, which yielded definitions based on super-ordinate, 
perceptual, spatial and function relations differed from 
states of the self and nominal kind concepts, which yielded 
definitions based on event and coordinate relations and 
examples. This dimension highlights the distinction between 
concrete concepts (natural kinds and artefacts) and abstract 
concepts (nominal kinds and states of the self). On the 
second dimension, explaining 21% of the total variance, 
emotion concepts and natural kinds, which yielded 
definitions based on cause, evaluation and super-ordinate 
relations, differed from artefacts, which yielded definitions 
based on function, mean and subordinate relations. This 
dimension highlights the relations that distinguish natural 
kinds and emotions from artefacts. The former elicited 
taxonomic information of the super-ordinate type, while the 
latter elicited taxonomic information of the subordinate type 
and information on their function. Moreover, while artefacts 
are defined relying on their functions, this kind of 
information is not involved in defining neither emotion nor 
natural kind concepts. In this set of concepts, those referring 
to cognitive processes are defined by a pattern of relations 
that is not specific. 
 
(B) Analysis on abstract conceptual domains. A 
Correspondence Analysis was performed, the variables of 
which were the abstract conceptual domains (cognitive 
processes, states of the self, nominal kinds and emotion 
concepts) and all the sub-types of the relations produced, as 
in Analysis (A). 
As figure 2 shows, on the first dimension explaining 47% of 
the total variance, emotion concepts, which yielded 
definitions based on super-ordinate and cause relations, 
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differed from nominal kinds, which yielded definitions 
based on coordinate relations and examples. On the second 
dimension, explaining 41% of the total variance, emotion 
concepts, which yielded definitions based on evaluative 
relations differed from cognitive processes, which yielded 
definitions based on spatial, function, means, perceptual and 
subordinate relations.  
Thus, while the domain of concepts referring to states of 
the self is not defined by a specific pattern of relations 
different from those of the other domains of abstract 
conceptual knowledge, that of nominal kind, emotion, and 
cognitive processes concepts were. The definitions of 
nominal kinds were characterized by the coordination 
taxonomic relation and by examples. That is why the 
concept “travel” was defined as “a shift of position” 
(coordinate) and the concept “flight” by “of the birds”, an 
example. Emotions’ concepts were defined by reference to 
their causes (“disappointment” was defined as “due to 
unrealised expectations”) and to evaluations (“anxiety” – 
was defined as “deep and strong”). The definitions of 
cognitive processes concepts rested on a great variety of 
relations mainly of the thematic kind (action, mean, function 
and space relations) and, thus, they differed from those 
provided for both nominal kind and emotion concepts.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Dim.1 in bold, Dim. 2 in frame, types of concepts 
in capital, relations in lowercase. 
 
Discussion 
Overall, analysis (A) and (B) have shown that the 
definitions of the exemplars of both the concrete and the 
abstract sub-domains of conceptual knowledge are shaped 
by specific kinds of conceptual information. Moreover, they 
also have shown that emotion concepts differ from concrete 
concepts as well as from the other types of abstract concepts 
considered, thus replicating Altarriba et al.’s (1999) and 
Altarriba & Bauer’s (2004) findings with a different 
methodology. 
 
Conclusions 
The domain of concrete concepts has been divided in 
artefact and natural kind concepts, and many studies have 
widely explored the different types of conceptual 
information shaping these two kinds. On the contrary, 
abstract conceptual knowledge includes a heterogeneous set 
of concepts, the differences among which, to our 
knowledge, have been largely unexplored, with the 
exception of emotion concepts. This study was an attempt to 
reduce this gap by investigating four abstract conceptual 
domains (states of the self, cognitive processes, nominal 
kinds and emotions). Experiment 1, with a rating task on the 
dimensions of concreteness, context availability, 
imageability and also abstractness, shows that the domains 
of abstract conceptual knowledge identified differ on these 
dimensions. Thus, Altarriba et al., ’s (1999) and Altarriba & 
Bauer ‘s (2004) results that emotion concepts give rise to a 
knowledge domain independent from both concrete and 
abstract knowledge domains were replicated.  
Experiment 2 with a production task has specified these 
differences as due to the specific conceptual information 
underlying the definitions of emotion concept nouns as they 
rest on their causes and on evaluations. Moreover, it has 
also highlighted the different types of conceptual 
information that characterize other sub-domains of abstract 
concepts. The definitions of nominal kinds, which are 
judged relatively highly concrete and imageable, were 
characterized by examples and coordinate taxonomic 
relations, which allow reference to concrete objects and 
situations. Concepts referring to cognitive processes elicited 
thematic information that refer to the specific contextualised 
events in which they take place. States of the self concepts, 
while characterized by events when contrasted with concrete 
concepts, when contrasted with abstract concepts did not 
show any specific pattern of information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Dim.1 in bold, Dim. 2 in frame, types of concepts 
in capital, relations in lowercase. 
 
In conclusion, besides replicating and extending Altarriba et 
al. (1999) findings on emotion concepts, this study, has 
begun to uncover the partitions that distinguish abstract 
conceptual domains. Further research will allow to test 
whether the domains of abstract knowledge we focused on 
are differently processed in on line tasks. Moreover a larger 
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range of abstract concept will be taken into account. Overall 
these results can be nicely accounted for by theories that 
assume conceptual knowledge as a continuum in which 
different types of concepts can be distinguished tank to the 
different kind of information they elicit (Barsalou, 1987).  
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